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1. INTRODUCTION 
Medical professionals obey the Hippocratic Oath, standing for 
the principle of ’do no harm.’1  But, at a point, refusing to provide 
care becomes the more ethical choice for medical professionals 
responsible for treating detainees and prisoners of war.  Torture 
and improper interrogation remain a constant and present practice 
during war, internationally and by the United States, especially in 
recent Administrations.2  Reports find that the “[l]egal, ethical, and 
medical condemnation have not been as effective as their 
proponents hoped:  torture is widespread in more than a third of 
countries, and medical implication is described in at least 40 
percent of reported torture cases.”3  Currently, the United States, 
other countries, and the international community have policies in 
place requiring medical professionals to provide adequate medical 
                                                     
*  University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. 2014; University of 
Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, M.B.E. 2014; The University of 
Michigan, B.A. 2006.  I would like to thank Professor Claire Finkelstein for her 
guidance and facilitating this comment; Kathy Nguyen, Shannon Doherty, and the 
entire Penn JIL editorial staff for its hard work on this comment and dedication to 
JIL; and my husband, Daniel Spradling, for his continued support and early 
editing.  All opinions and mistakes are my own. 
1  Greek Medicine, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH: HIST. OF MED. DIV., 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2013) (including the history of and the current edition of the Hippocratic Oath, 
with the phrase “do no harm”). 
2  Chiara Lepora & Joseph Millum, The Tortured Patient: A Medical Dilemma, 41 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 38, 38 (2011). 
3  Id. at 39 (footnotes omitted). 
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care during interrogations or for prisoners of war.4  However, if 
detainees are subjected to multiple interrogations or torture that 
create physically and mentally stressful situations, then when 
doctors and medical professionals render care, they are only 
prolonging this suffering. 
When ’do no harm‘ is upheld by not rendering care, the 
international community and the United States do not have proper 
policies and practices in place that permit and protect the medical 
professionals making these decisions.  This comment will examine 
the intersection between medical ethics, morality, and the law in 
circumstances of interrogation and with detainees, especially 
during the time of war when aims of national security and war are 
particularly prevalent.  International communities and the United 
States should implement policies that will protect medical 
professionals from liability for torture or complicity to torture 
offenses in these limited circumstances where refusing care is 
required.  These policies should also include notice and reporting 
requirements to ensure that these decisions are not made within a 
vacuum and allow for correction of improper treatment before the 
refusal of treatment. 
Section 2 will examine the background of torture statutes, 
medical ethics, and the combatant status of detainees.  Exploring 
an example of refusing to provide care in Libya will provide 
helpful insight into the current state of policies as well as real 
circumstances doctors are facing in the field.  This section will also 
evaluate these current policies regarding whether doctors and 
medical professionals can refuse to provide care. 
Section 3 provides the ethical evaluation of these proposed 
actions, or more properly described as inactions.  Drawing analogy 
between the ethics and policies of the medical community’s refusal 
of allowing psychiatrists to participate in the death penalty serves 
as an important and relevant example to understanding the moral 
obligations in refusing care.  I also advocate in this section for an 
intention-based model of ethical evaluation over a consequence-
based model to justify these actions.  However, refusing to provide 
care can also be justified under a consequence-focused evaluation.  
This section introduces some war conventions, rule of war 
principles, and other duties of medical professionals that apply in 
these circumstances. 
                                                     
4  See infra notes 11, 16–18 and accompanying text. 
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Not only is this course of action ethically justified, but Section 4 
will explore why it should also be legal to refuse to provide care, 
and why providing care might already be illegal.  Providing care 
equates to complicity to torture or violates torture statutes in 
extreme situations.  Many situations are close calls and fall into a 
gray area that require keen professional judgment, but black and 
white situations do exist for evaluating what the laws should 
prevent. 
Section 5 provides policy proposals based on the ethical and 
legal permissibility.  These policies should exist as exceptions to 
providing adequate care in circumstances where trained medical 
professionals determine that repeated offenses are likely to occur 
and that treatment will only contribute to ongoing interrogation 
and torture efforts.  These policy exceptions are not without 
safeguards.  These safeguards include notice requirements by the 
medical professionals to offending individuals and governments 
that the physicians will discontinue care if the mistreatment of 
detainees does not cease.  Doctors will also have reporting 
requirements, including following established lines of reporting for 
medical professionals.  These policy exceptions will allow for 
doctors and medical professionals to preserve their medical 
autonomy while still protecting detainees and the international 
community from continued human rights abuses.  This section also 
explores recently proposed state legislation protecting medical 
professionals in situations regarding torture.  By refusing to 
provide care, these professionals are providing the right medical 
and ethical decision for these detainees to lessen their suffering, 
and this paper provides the legal policies that allow them to do it. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Combatants and Unarmed Combatants 
 
Defining the status of detainees is relevant to the discussion of 
what type of medical care detainees should or should not receive 
because, traditionally, different ethics apply to individuals at a 
time of war based on their status.5  An enemy combatant is “a 
person engaged in hostilities against [a country] during an armed 
                                                     
5  MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (3d ed. 2000). 
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conflict.”6  The Principle of Distinction is a Rule of War principle 
that allows for the killing of combatants,7 based on their status, at 
any time, regardless of what they are doing, even if that action is 
sleeping, while prohibiting the intentional killing of civilians.8  
Thus, how an individual is treated in war is based on their status, 
not by the activity in which they are engaged.  An exception under 
the Principle of Distinction applies to combatants that have 
surrendered or that are injured and out of combat.9  Because of this 
exception, surrendered and/or injured combatants cannot be killed 
at any point, and rather certain duties and protections attach to 
these individuals.10  These protections include receiving adequate 
medical care and humane treatment.11  Thus, for doctors and 
medical professionals, this loss of combatant status creates a type 
of duty to protect these detainees by creating a duty to provide 
adequate medical care.12  This paper will explore what adequate 
medical care means in situations of continued and repeated 
incidents of improper interrogation and torture. 
 
2.2. Torture Statutes 
 
Currently, the United States, European Union, and other 
sources of international law have extensive statutes, policies, and 
practices governing the treatment of torture that continue to 
                                                     
6  DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3 (FM 34-52): HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, at viii, 5-20 (2006) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL], 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22- 
3.pdf. 
7  JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES (2005), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1 
(outlining 161 rules for international humanitarian law, including rule 1 titled 
“The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants”). 
8  WALZER, supra note 5, at 138. 
9  Id. (“[O]nce war has begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any time (unless 
they are wounded or captured).”). 
10  See ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 6, at viii (“All captured or detained 
personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 . . . .”). 
11  GUIDELINES TO EU POLICY TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES ON TORTURE AND 
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (2008), available 
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TortureGuidelines.pdf. 
12  See supra note 11 and infra notes 16–17, 22–24 and accompanying text. 
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develop, even within the last ten years.  For the United States, 
during the Bush Administration, Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld ordered that doctors had to certify prisoners “medically 
and operationally” suitable for torture and to be present for 
sessions.13  At Abu Ghraib, a military prison in Iraq, interrogations 
had to be preapproved by a physician and a psychiatrist, though 
reports since have found that these medical approvals did not 
ensure or even give notice that the interrogations were medically 
ethical.14  Similarly, military doctors’ failure to report torture, even 
informally, became a repeated issue.15  During Obama 
Administration, following the public outcry regarding U.S. 
practices at Guantanamo, the President took action to improve the 
U.S. stance toward interrogation.  In 2006, his Administration 
changed the Department of Defense’s detention policy to ban 
“depriv[ing] detainees of the necessary food, water 
and medical care,” though a 2014 Senate Select Intelligence 
Committee report contained allegations that the Central 
Intelligence Committee (CIA) continues to use medical personnel 
in interrogations.16  The Army Field Manual includes these 
                                                     
13  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum for the Commander, 
US Southern Command, DEP’T OF DEFENSE, tab B(x)(iii), (vi) (Apr. 16, 2003), available 
at http://www.defense.gov/news/jun2004/d20040622doc9.pdf (quoting the 
unclassified document written by Secretary Rumsfeld regarding “Counter-
Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism”). 
14  Justine Sharrock, First, Do Harm, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2009, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/first-do-harm. 
15  See, e.g., Sophie Arie, Doctors Need Better Training to Recognise and Report 
Torture, BMJ, Sept. 9, 2011, http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d5766 
(“Military doctors have also failed to report signs of abuse in detainees); CBS 
News, U.S. Doctors Participated in Torture of Detainees, Report Claims, CBCNEWS 
(Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/u-s-doctors-participated-in-
torture-of-detainees-report-claims-1.2355511 (“The task force alleges that DoD 
practices and policies . . . co-opted [doctors] into violating professional standards 
and ethics through actions that included . . . [f]ailing to report abuses against 
detainees ‘under recognized international standards.’”); Harriet Sherwood, Israeli 
Doctors ‘Failing to Report Torture of Palestinian Detainees,’ THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 
2011, 4:53 AM) (reporting on accusations that Israeli doctors are failing to report 
injuries of detainees that relate to abusive interrogations and torture).  
16  Lieutenant General John Kimmons, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence, Defense Department News Briefing on Detainee Policies (Sept. 6, 
2006) (transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601442.html); SEN. SELECT COMM. ON 
INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S 
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SENATE CIA 
REPORT], available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/executive-
summary.pdf.  The report includes accusations that medical professionals 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
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requirements and prohibits implementing any forms of 
interrogation outside what is described in the manual.17  Though 
no case in the U.S. courts has held medical professionals liable for 
torture, the medical community collectively disapproves of these 
actions by medical professionals and works to find solutions to 
preventing these deviations from ethical behavior in the future.18 
Torture laws and policies also restrict doctors and medical 
professionals, such as nurses, from participating in interrogations.  
Reports from Guantanamo found that psychiatrists and other 
physicians were providing information about detainees to make 
interrogation techniques “more efficient” and permitted these 
professionals to closely monitor the interrogations.19  As The 
Constitutional Project states, “the use of psychologists, 
psychiatrists and other physicians, and other medical and mental 
health personnel, [] help assist and guide interrogations that were 
often brutal.”20  The medical community quickly spoke out against 
these types of actions, once they were known, and supported the 
ban on participating in such activities because this type of 
professional behavior violates medical ethics.21  Thus, though 
                                                     
continue to assist in brutal interrogation techniques, including specific instances 
when medical professionals administered unnecessary and improper rectal 
rehydration on detainees.  Jennifer Bendrey, Dianne Feinstein: No, the CIA Did Not 
Use Rectal Hydration as ‘a Medical Procedure’ on Detainees, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 
12, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/12/dianne-feinstein-cia-
torture-report_n_6318336.html.  The CIA denied these accusations.  Id. 
17  See generally ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 6 (explicitly stating that the 
interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for use are those 
authorized and listed in this Field Manual).  
18  See AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 2.067: Torture 
(1999) [hereinafter CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS] (stating the AMA’s opposition to any 
type of participation in torture in Opinion 2.067: Torture); see also THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK FORCE ON 
DETAINEE TREATMENT: ABRIDGED VERSION 30–31 (2013) [hereinafter THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT], available at http://detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/abridged-
final.pdf (asserting the need for professional medical involvement by medical 
professionals in detention and interrogation operations processes).  
19  THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 18, at 30.  
20  Id. at 30–31 (“The involvement of medical personnel was ostensibly to 
make the process more efficient (psychologists could provide guidance to 
interrogators as to how best obtain information) . . . .”); see Sharrock, supra note 14 
(“[Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld ordered that doctors had to certify 
prisoners ‘medically and operationally’ suitable for torture and be present for the 
sessions.”). 
21  THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 18, at 31 (“[The American 
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medical professionals are required to provide adequate medical 
care, they cannot overstep those boundaries.  
Internationally, torture is regularly defined as including “acts 
of omission, such as prolonged denial of . . . medical assistance.”22  
Article 7 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) binds international communities from using 
torture, administering cruel and unusual punishment, and 
conducting medical experiments without a patient’s consent.23  
Part of these policies stems from a tradition of providing medical 
care to detainees.24  Various statues require ‘adequate medical care’ 
in these various torture and detention statute and laws.  
International courts and tribunals additionally find violations of 
torture statutes when medical care is not provided.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia reported 
on woefully inadequate medical assistance in Prosecutor v. Kvocka, 
ICTFY.25  In Achuthan v. Malawi, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights found a violation of Article 5 of the 
                                                     
Psychiatric Association] decided, with little dissent, that its members could not 
ethically participate in any way in the interrogations.”). 
22  Torture includes “acts of omission, such as prolonged denial of rest, sleep, 
food, sufficient hygiene, or medical assistance . . . .”  David Weissbrodt & Cheryl 
Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 LAW & 
INEQ. 343, 378 (2011) (citing Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm’n on Human Rights, 
42d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 106–17 (Feb. 16, 1986) (by P. 
Kooijmans)).  See ECCC Training Materials, INT’L CRIM. L. SERVS. & OPEN SOC’Y 
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ¶ 60 (2009), available at http://www.iclsfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/eccc-trainingmaterials-icls-osji-09-prt5.pdf (“The 
following acts have been found to constitute torture by the UN Human Rights 
Committee, the European Court of Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture for the UN Commission on Human Rights: . . . prolonged denial of 
medical assistance . . . .”). 
23  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.   
24  See GUIDELINES TO EU POLICY, supra note 11 (requiring medical care for 
detainees); see also Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Review of the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners: 2013I, Comm’n on Human Rights, 68th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/68/295, ¶¶ 46, 50 (Aug. 9, 2013) (by Juan E. Méndez) (stating that “a lack of 
financial resources cannot be an excuse for not . . . providing food and medical 
treatment” and that “[t]he State must provide adequate medical care”); STEVEN H. 
MILES, OATH BETRAYED: TORTURE, MEDICAL COMPLICITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
(2006) (stating that the United States has a “tradition of medical care for prisoners 
of war”). 
25  Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 61–67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 2, 2001). 
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African Charter, which prohibits “torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment and treatment” when a detainee was 
denied “access to adequate medical care.”26  The UN Human 
Rights Committee held that being deprived of “adequate medical 
care,” inter alia, resulted in torture in Mika Miha v. Equatorial 
Guinea.27  This strong history in the international community 
supports physicians in providing care, though these same 
protections and provisions do not always provide for exceptions to 
refuse to provide care when medical care assists torturers. 
 
2.3. Medical Ethics 
 
The Hippocratic Oath is taken by most doctors and medical 
professionals, and is commonly known for standing for ‘do no 
harm.’28  Much like the professional ethics of lawyers, the 
physician-patient relationship enjoys protections and privileges of 
confidentiality, duties of communication, and protections from 
termination without notice, cause, or completion of care.29  These 
ethics apply regardless if the patient is a former enemy combatant 
or whether they are practicing in a hostile situation, such as a 
prison’s medical center or with detainees subjected to improper 
treatments.  As Dr. Steven H. Miles examines in his book regarding 
medical ethics with detainees:  “Medical ethics and international 
codes of conduct oblige [medical professionals] to prevent and 
disclose torture.”30  Thus, in addition to moral ethics, doctors, like 
lawyers, are subject to professional ethics.  These ethics include 
assessing the medical situation of their patient and treating in a 
way that ultimately does ‘no harm’ to the patients.  This duty to 
their patients should come before their roles as a soldier, military 
                                                     
26  Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda) v. Malawi, African Comm’n on 
Human & Peoples’ Rights, 8th Annual Activity Report, Comm’n No. 64/92, ¶ 7 
(1995), available at http:// www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/64-
92b.html. 
27  Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Commc’n No. 414/1990, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990, ¶ 6.4 (U.N. Human Rights Comm. 1994), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws414.htm. 
28  See Greek Medicine, supra note 1.  
29  CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18 (referencing Opinion 10.10: 
Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship, which include 
confidentiality, continuity of treatment, and other duties and obligations). 
30  MILES, supra note 24. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/3
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doctor, or any other role they may be fulfilling.31 
 
2.4. Recent Example of Refusing to Provide Care 
 
A recent example out of Libya serves as a model where doctors 
decided that they upheld their medical ethics by refusing to 
provide care to detainees subjected to torture.  In July 2013, 
Doctors Without Borders (or Médecins Sans Frontières) 
(“DWB/MSF”) refused to continue to treat victims of 
interrogations and torture because of their repeated injuries from 
abuse.32  Patients were brought to prison doctors and medical 
professionals between interrogations for medical treatment so that 
the detainees could heal from the wounds they sustained during 
beatings and torture, only to return to the interrogation centers to 
withstand further brutal interrogations.33  The doctors and medical 
professionals stated their role is to “’provide medical care to war 
casualties and sick detainees, not to repeatedly treat the same 
patients between torture sessions.’”34  Both officially recognized 
military and security bodies carried out these interrogations, as 
well as by a number of armed militias operating outside any legal 
framework.35  The group of doctors treated 115 detainees in total36 
                                                     
31  George J. Annas, Military Medical Ethics – Physicians First, Last, Always, 359 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1087, 1087–90 (2008) (arguing that physicians should remember, 
especially in the face of human rights violations like torture, not only that they are 
physicians “first” but that they are also physicians “‘last and always’”). 
32  Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, Libya: Detainees Tortured and 
Denied Medical Care (Jan. 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/press-release/libya-
detainees-tortured-and-denied-medical-care.  
33  Id.  See also MSNBC.com News Services, Medical Group Refuses to Treat 
Libya Prisoners ‘Between Torture Sessions,’ NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:04 PM), 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/01/26/10245098-medical-group-
refuses-to-treat-libya-prisoners-between-torture-sessions (providing additional 
reporting on the DWB/MSF decision to withdraw from providing care in Libya). 
34  Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32 (quoting DWB/MSF 
General Director Christopher Stokes).  
35  See id. (stating that notification letters were sent to “the Misrata Military 
Council, the Misrata Security Committee, the National Army Security Service, and 
the Misrata Local Civil Council”).  See also MSNBC.com News Services, supra note 
33 (noting the torture was carried out by “officially recognized military and 
security bodies as well as by a number of armed militias operating outside any 
legal framework”).  
36  Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32. 
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for torture related injuries, including a group of nine detainees 
after the doctors sent notification letters.37  The doctors identified 
numerous injuries and obvious signs of torture, including two 
deaths.38  Before refusing to provide care, the doctors notified the 
National Army Security Service that a number of patients needed 
to be transferred to hospitals for urgent and specialized care.39  
However, these patients were taken back to interrogation centers.40  
Thus, even after notifying the offending bodies and stating that the 
doctors would have to refuse to provide medical care, the doctors 
continued to receive tortured patients.41  Only after that point did 
DWB/MSF cut off providing care.42 
This example provides a realistic view of what some doctors 
and medical professionals face, or will have to face, within this 
realm of practicing medicine.  The DWB/MSF example also 
provides a practical, responsible guide for actions that should be 
taken when doctors and medical professionals determine, based on 
their medical and ethical judgment, that providing care is no 
longer acceptable for these patients.  This example shows what 
refusing care would look like in practice as this comment examines 
the ethical justification of these actions and proposes a legal 
framework to support it. 
 
3. ETHICAL EVALUATION OF REFUSING TO PROVIDE CARE 
3.1. Ethical Analysis 
 
Physicians and medical professionals are justified in refusing to 
provide care to detainees under certain conditions because their 
actions, if performed with a permissible intention, ultimately fulfill 
                                                     
37  Id. (“The most alarming case [was] when MSF doctors treated a group of 
14 detainees who returned to a detention facility from an interrogation center.  
Despite previous MSF demands for the immediate end of torture, 9 of the 14 
detainees had suffered numerous injuries and displayed obvious signs of 
torture.”). 
38  See MSNBC.com News Services, supra note 33 (providing additional 
information regarding the injuries and suspected deaths).  
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id.  See also Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32 
(referencing receiving nine detainees that were victims of repeated torture). 
42  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss3/3
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their duty to do no harm and end prolonged suffering of their 
patient.  This ethical justification is not based on consequences 
alone, though doctors and medical professionals must determine 
whether their actions of treating a detainee will ultimately lead to 
the continued suffering of that patient.  I argue that the intention to 
minimize harm is required, rather than the consequences alone of 
refusing care, because the actor must have an ethical state of mind 
to fulfill their professional and ethical duty to not harm others.  
Refusing care in these circumstances is also analogous to the 
medical community’s prohibition on participating in the death 
penalty, specifically in that psychiatrists cannot determine a 
prisoner’s mental fitness for execution. 
Doctors and medical professionals must use their trained 
medical judgment to assess the specific situation that they face, and 
must ultimately decide that refusing to care for a certain patient is 
the justified course action.  Refusing to provide care is justified 
because it fulfills the deontological duty to others as well as the 
professional duty to do no harm.  (Though I advocate from a 
deontological point of view, consequentialists could also find that 
not providing care is justified in these circumstances because the 
overall consequences of the action – the reduction of continued 
pain and suffering of the detainee – increases the good to justify 
the action.)  A duty to others, similar to the duty to ‘do no harm,’ is 
a core deontological duty.43  In determining where their duty to 
others is implicated, the medical professional must consider factors 
like the extent of the detainee’s injuries, the likelihood the injuries 
will occur again, and other relevant factors.  For example, if a 
detainee is a repeat patient for the same or similar injuries that 
correlate with circumstances of abusive interrogation or torture, 
the doctor can likely assume this patient will continue to suffer the 
same or similar injuries after he recovers with the aid of that 
doctor.44  Once this duty to others is implicated, medical 
professionals must act to protect and assist the detainee because of 
their position  and ability to provide care.  Then, any of the 
                                                     
43  Kantian Duty Based (Deontological) Ethics, SEVEN PILLARS INST., 
http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/morality-101/kantian-duty-based-deontological-
ethics (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) (stating Kant’s first categorical imperative of “’Do 
not impose on others what you do not wish for yourself’” and his second 
categorical imperative that “a person must maintain her moral duty to seek an 
end that is equal for all people”). 
44  This determination is much like the one the DWB/MSF physicians made.  
See Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32. 
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doctors’ and medical professionals’ actions to reduce the pain and 
suffering endured by this patient are justified, if done with the aim 
to fulfill this duty to others.  These actions may require treating, or 
they may require refusing to provide care if the physician or nurse 
determines that their assistance to the patient will only lead to the 
repeated abuse. 
Making the determination not to treat is no easy task.  Gray 
areas will exist that may require additional consideration of other 
deontological duties and factors based on the facts of each case.  
However, black and white cases do exist, as demonstrated in the 
example above with Libya.  These clear cases are when the doctors 
reasonably know that providing treatment will only keep the 
detainees healthy enough to be subjected to more torture and 
abusive interrogations.  At this point, if the doctor provides 
immediate treatment, they would contribute to the detainee’s long-
term pain and suffering because the detainee is now available to 
endure further torture and other abusive conduct.  Here, the 
doctors and medical professionals become a part of the cycle of 
torture and abusive interrogations.  In these circumstances, the 
medical professionals involved need to follow their duty to others, 
refuse to treat the detainee, and cease to assist in the detainee’s 
continued pain and suffering.  
 
3.2. Intention-Based Model Is Required for Justification 
 
Having policy and laws that focus on reducing the overall 
amount of suffering for a detainee seem to satisfy ethics models 
based on deontological and consequentialist principles.  However, 
I argue that, in these circumstances, an ethics model focused on 
intentions and duties is best because this model provides 
important limits on what behavior is ethically justified.  Limits 
come from duties, similar to duties that doctors develop through 
their responsibilities as members of the medical community.  These 
duties also promote behavior that is desirable – getting good, 
unbiased treatment decisions – rather than decisions based on 
outcomes that could also satisfy other ‘bad’ motivations, such as 
being primarily motivated by a dislike for what the detainee 
believes or supports. 
G. E. M. Anscombe advocates for an intention-based model, 
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especially as it applies to war.45  Anscombe makes this distinction 
because she finds that the morality of decisions is based in the 
intentions of the actor,46 not in the culpability of the opposing 
actor47 or total utility of a situation.48  These intentions matter 
because they are linked to the duties and absolute prohibitions – 
duty to others, duty to not kill, etc. – that one must follow as moral 
actors.49  Thus, the intent to act in accordance with duties – both 
that are innate and those that apply as a professional – should be 
the measure of whether an act is justified or not, and not what 
happens after the act.50  This focus on intent to comply with duties 
and prohibitions is also what places the limit on conduct that 
Anscombe discusses.  These duties and absolute prohibitions 
provide the clear-cut impermissible cases so that the doctrine of 
double effect is not taken to its extreme.51  Though, her distinction 
still allows for actions with ‘bad’ consequences, such as death of 
the detainee from lack of care, because the actor was ultimately 
attempting to act morally within the permissible bounds of her 
duties and prohibitions.52 
Take the hypothetical case that is modeled off what was seen in 
Guantanamo.53  A detainee is brought to the prison hospital, 
showing signs of repeated beating, food depravation, and 
exhaustion.  He also exhibits symptoms of diabetic shock resulting 
from the conditions that he endured.  One doctor assesses that he 
has seen this patient before many times, and previously notified 
                                                     
45  G. E. M. Anscombe, War and Murder, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A CATHOLIC 
RESPONSE 45 (Walter Stein ed., 1961). 
46  Id. 
47  See JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (2009) (advocating for a model where 
the culpability of the actor is determinative). 
48  Utility of a situation, or utilitarianism, is similar to Consequentialism, both 
of which are seen as opposing theories to deontological/duty-based ethical 
models.  
49  Anscombe, supra note 45. 
50  Id.  
51  Anscombe includes a very good analysis of the limits of ‘intention’ to 
avoid taking the doctrine of double effect too far to essentially render ‘intention’ 
meaningless.  See id. 
52  See id. (providing the example of self-defense when one is intending to 
“ward off an attack” not intending to kill someone).  
53  Sharrock, supra note 14 (detailing a story out of Guantanamo where a 
medic wanted to treat detainee for diabetic shock, but was ridiculed and ignored 
by higher-ups, colleagues, and soldiers, so care was not rendered.  The detainee 
ended up dying from lack of treatment, though he did not suffer further abusive 
interrogation). 
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his superiors and other officials of the patient’s condition and 
general concerns regarding his condition.  The doctor ultimately 
makes a judgment not to treat the patient because the doctor 
reasonably believes that if he treats the patient today, he will only 
continue to see this patient after future torture sessions.  Another 
doctor in the hospital encounters the same patient, but refuses to 
treat because she does not approve of this patient’s extreme beliefs 
and knows what will reasonably result from not treating.  Because 
of the lack of treatment, the detainee dies of diabetic shock.  In both 
of these cases, where one doctor decides not to treat to cause the 
least amount of harm and the other doctor chooses not to treat 
because she does not value the detainee, the harm avoided – 
prolonged suffering from being subjected to aggressive 
interrogations – is the same.  Yet, Anscombe would find these cases 
are different moral situations where the first case is justifiable and 
the second is not based on the intent of the doctor. 
Anscombe finds a moral distinction between the first doctor’s 
action that merely foresees (not treating a patient) a bad 
consequence (patient dies) and that same action from the second 
doctor that intends (not treating a patient) the bad consequence 
(patient dies).  Part of this distinction is because the first doctor is 
not attempting to bring about the bad consequence, but rather 
something else:  minimizing the pain and suffering of the patient.  
Anscombe does caution against using this logic to its extreme 
where it becomes dangerous54 – i.e. the second doctor incorrectly 
rationalizing, ’I didn’t intend to let the patient die, I simply 
intended to not to provide care, thus it’s permissible.’  Anscombe 
recognizes that, when taken to the extreme, the doctrine of double 
effect can justify anything from the actor’s point of view.55  Thus, 
when applied correctly, the intention-based rationale is the most 
appropriate here because only doctors who exercise their proper 
medical judgment should be justified in their actions, not those 
trying to achieve other ill-intended results under the veil of 
treatment.  In other words, for this hypothetical example, 
intending the patient’s death is different from foreseeing that death 
                                                     
54  Anscombe, supra note 45 (cautioning against mistaking what one actually 
intends and what one attempts to say they ‘intend’ to merely justify their action, 
essentially expressing the limits of the doctrine of double effect). 
55  Id. (“It is nonsense to pretend that you do not intend to do what is the 
means you take to your chosen end.  Otherwise there is absolutely no substance to 
the [Christian] teaching that we may not do evil that good may come.”).  Id. at 59. 
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when refusing to provide care because these two acts can be 
distinguished between the ‘wanting’ of something to happen 
(second doctor) and the ‘predicting’ something will happen (first 
doctor).  Doctors ‘wanting’ the bad consequence by not treating are 
not justified in their actions.  The doctor who can predict a death 
while refusing to provide care for the patient’s overall well-being is 
the one executing a justified act.  Again, having a ‘good motive’ 
while foreseeing a bad consequence still lends to an ethically 
justified act. 
 
3.3. The Medical Ethics Analogy of Treating on Death Row 
 
The medical community’s refusal to participate in the death 
penalty provides a strong analogy to the policy, reasoning, and 
ethics of refusing to provide care to those subjected to repeated 
torture.  The medical community has “longstanding and absolute 
prohibition” of participating in lethal injection executions.56  
Because the Eighth Amendment bans the execution of the mentally 
incompetent,57 this prohibition in the United States includes 
banning psychiatrists from declaring a death row inmate mentally 
competent for execution.58  The medical community finds that 
engaging in such behavior violates the core medical ethics, and this 
prohibition is balanced against the State’s desire to inflict 
punishment, much like the national security goals that medical 
practitioners face during a time of war.59  The American 
Medication Association’s (AMA) prohibition rationalizes that 
                                                     
56  Lawrence Nelson & Brandon Ashby, Rethinking the Ethics of Physician 
Participation in Lethal Injection Execution, 41 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (2011). 
57  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 339 (1986) (holding that executing those 
inmates that are not mentally competent is cruel and unusual punishment and 
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment). 
58  See Alfred M. Freedman & Abraham L. Halpern, A Crisis in the Ethical and 
Moral Behavior of Psychiatrists, 11 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (1998), 
available at 
http://www.wpanet.org/uploads/Publications/WPA_Books/Additional_Public 
ations/WPA_Forums_on_Current_Opinion/psychiatrists-death-penalty.pdf 
(debating the purpose and ban on psychiatric evaluations of competence to be 
executed). 
59  See id. (“Psychiatrists today are indeed torn between traditional ethical 
principles and strong pressures from society, particularly certain segments of the 
legal profession, to make compromises and become collaborators in the demands 
of the law.”). 
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“[p]hysician participation in executions contradicts the dictates of 
the medical profession by causing harm rather than alleviating 
pain and suffering.”60  The World Psychiatric Association Congress 
unanimously agreed that “’[u]nder no circumstances should 
psychiatrists participate in legally authorized executions nor 
participate in assessments of competence to be executed.’”61 
Refusing to make competency determinations and refusing to 
provide care for detainees subjected to abusive interrogations and 
torture are analogous because, in both cases, the physician is not 
actively participating in the harmful act (administering life ending 
drugs or torture tactics), but their actions directly contribute to the 
administration of the harmful act.  A death row prisoner cannot 
receive a lethal injection unless a psychiatrist determines they are 
mentally competent.62  Similarly, a detainee that needs treatment 
after being subjected to abusive interrogations and torture cannot 
return to their interrogator without receiving treatment.  Thus, 
both of these physicians directly participate to their patient’s cycle 
of ‘harm.’  Because the medical community agrees that 
psychiatrists are ethically prohibited from participating in 
competence evaluations for executions, even though they are not 
directly administrating harm, physicians also cannot ethically treat 
detainees that will only receive repeated abuses as a result of being 
treated. 
One key reason for prohibiting the participation of 
psychiatrists in the death penalty is the proximity of the doctor’s 
action to the execution.63  Drs. Alfred M. Freedman and Abraham 
L. Halpern state, “The proximity of this participation and the act of 
killing casts doctors, metaphorically, as hangmen’s accomplices.”64  
This same proximity is also found in torture.  When torture is 
repeated, a cycle of abuse is formed.  This cycle includes medical 
treatment to keep detainees alive and well enough to sustain the 
next round of interrogation or torture.  The doctors’ participation 
                                                     
60  AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CEJA 
REPORT A-I-92, at 365 (1992), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/206b.pdf. 
61  See Freedman & Halpern, supra note 58, at 1 (examining the ethics of 
psychiatrists’ participation in the death penalty). 
62  See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.  Ford v. Wainwright also holds 
that inmates must receive a competency determination upon request.  477 U.S. 
399, 430–31 (1986).  
63  Freedman & Halpern, supra note 58. 
64  Id. at 1.  
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as a part of the cycle becomes impermissible because the doctors 
become ethical ‘accomplices’ to the torturers. 
Counter arguments for allowing psychiatrists to participate the 
death penalty are similar to those that apply to torture:  these 
arguments state that the psychiatrists are providing a dual role for 
the justice system.  In other words, physicians should be acting as 
something other than ‘physicians first.’  Thus, these psychiatrists 
are not subject to traditional medical ethics.  Proponents of 
absolute prohibitions for psychiatrists actually caution against this 
type of argument because of its implications for physicians in 
“executions, torture or managed care administration.”65  This 
reasoning strips a psychiatrist, or physician, from any medical 
ethics’ limitations and leaves the physician as an unregulated 
practitioner.  This practice also risks losing the trust of the public, 
or worse “public condemnation.”66  In addition to the reaction of 
the public, the medical community makes it clear that declaring 
prisoners competent for the death penalty is simply participating 
in unethical behavior.  This same rationale and prohibition should 
apply to medical professionals treating detainees subjected to 
repeated torture and abuse, and that the risk of placing these 
doctors in close proximity to the torturers is just too great.   
 
3.4. Additional Applicable War Conventions:  Mixture of Law 
and Ethics 
 
War conventions are formed from a combination of culture, 
legal, ethical, and other priorities from various countries and the 
international community.  This comment already discussed the 
medical ethics, professional standards, and existing laws that 
contribute to war conventions surrounding treating, or not 
treating, in situations of abusive interrogation and torture.  Other 
sources of culture and codes additionally lend themselves to this 
discussion.  Rule of War principles, such as the Principle of 
Distinction, discussed supra in Section 2.1., also provides the 
necessary understanding that status of the individuals that receive 
treatment.  These principles are important because detainees 
receive more protections and considerations than enemy 
                                                     
65  Id. at 1.  
66  Id. 
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combatants.67  Thus, doctors and medical professionals must act 
with intentions to assist these patients, rather than ignoring or 
intentionally wanting to cause their immediate suffering, even if 
they ultimately act in the detainee’s best interests overall.  
According to these international conventions, doctors must care for 
their patients as ‘physicians first,’ rather than as a soldier or other 
role that may place the patient second to other considerations.68  
Lastly, though these proposed policies require notice requirements, 
arguably these abuses are jus cogens – crimes against humanity – 
and the offending individuals should know that medical 
professionals do not provide their services to support torture and 
abuse.  Thus, withdrawing from providing these medical services 
do not necessarily require notice that is generally required by other 
medical duties. 
In addition to the war conventions, special protections are 
guaranteed in the physician-patient relationship, such as 
confidentiality and continuity.  In these circumstances, the 
physician can approach the physician-patient relationship in two 
ways.  First, the doctor can consider that a physician-patient 
relationship does not exist because the doctor does not intend to 
treat the detainee, and the doctor has this intent from the 
beginning.  She must act in a way that would not lead a detainee to 
perceive that he is the doctor’s patient.  Further, such as the doctors 
in Libya did, the doctors may remove themselves from the prison 
hospital, so that they would not be present to even receive the 
patients.  Second, if the doctor decides that a physician-patient 
relationship does exist between the detainee and doctor, the doctor 
may decide that refusing to treat is the best course of treatment 
that the patient should receive.  In addition, the doctor may have 
other issues, such as patient consent, which is raised in Section 5.3. 
Patient confidentiality would also be implicated in these 
circumstances.  However, the doctor can keep the patient’s identity 
confidential, especially in regards to military reporting 
requirements, or, more likely, consider that revealing this 
information is not a breach of confidentiality because it is used for 
the protection of other persons from a known risk and because the 
                                                     
67  See supra Section 2.1.  
68  See Annas, supra note 31 (citing the ’physician first‘ mantra, but 
concluding that “’physician first’ guidance is only half the story;” though “[b]asic 
human-rights violations, including torture, inhumane treatment, and 
experimentation without consent, can never be justified”). 
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information is revealed internally to determine a future course of 
action or treatment.  These additional duties are very important 
and should be considered in how the medical professionals follow 
the proposed requirements of this policy, though medical 
professionals will have to balance these duties with the overall best 
interests of the patient. 
 
4. LEGAL EVALUATION 
 
Providing care can be considered as violating torture laws and 
policies because when doctors help keep detainees well enough to 
participate in abusive interrogations and torture, they are aiding in 
the cycle of torture.  These doctors can be seen as participants in 
torture, either as complicit to torture or implicated as participants 
in a conspiracy, much like criminal conspiracy.  On the other hand, 
although refusing to provide care is ethically justified and 
providing care is illegal, refusing to provide care can also violate 
some current torture statutes, international laws, and policies.  
Because detainees are required to receive adequate medical care, 
one could find that doctors refusing to provide care are in violation 
of these statues.  To correct this possibility, I propose clear 
exceptions, along with certain requirements to these policies in 
Section 5. 
 
4.1. Violations of Torture Statutes and Criminal Laws 
 
Complicity to torture is a violation included in many torture 
law policies.  Article 4 of Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
requires countries to establish crimes for torture, including 
complicity to torture.69  Currently, the United States has 
established the Torture Victims Protection Act, which established 
“an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action” for 
torture violations.70  Article 3 of UN Resolution 37 also expressly 
prohibits medical professionals’ participation and complicity in 
                                                     
69  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc CAT/C/28/Add.5, art. 4, entered into force 
Feb. 9, 2000.  See also Weissbrodt & Heilman, supra note 22, at 353 n.51. 
70  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–256, H.R. 2092, 106 Stat. 
73 (1992). 
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torture.71  It states, “It is . . . an offence under applicable 
international instruments, for health personnel, particularly 
physicians, to engage, actively or passively, in acts which 
constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement to or attempts 
to commit torture.”72  Thus, if medical professionals do continue to 
treat patients as a part of a cycle of torture, they could be held 
liable for directly violating these statutes. 
Under the U.S. Model Penal Code (MPC) definitions of 
conspiracy and complicity, an individual is held criminally liable 
for crimes that a group of which she is a member commits.  These 
crimes require only belonging to extend this liability.73  With the 
MPC, the law assumes that even if an individual is not directly 
participating in the crime, they are nonetheless liable because of 
their membership and knowledge of what the group plans to 
commit, finding them implicitly involved.74  As discussed infra in 
Section 5.3., rather than helping to prevent abuse, medical 
professionals’ presence during interrogations actually enables 
improper interrogation tactics.75  Criminal Conspiracy, § 5.03 of the 
MPC, states “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with another person 
or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of . . . facilitating 
its commission [s]he . . . agrees to aid such other person or persons 
in the . . . commission of such crime.”76  For complicity, § 2.06 states 
“a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of 
an offense if . . . with the purpose of . . . facilitating the commission 
of the offense, [s]he . . . aids . . . such other person in planning or 
committing it.”77  Because torture is without argument a crime, 
doctors and other medical professionals could be considered 
complicit or co-conspirators to torture in circumstances where 
medical professionals are aware of abuse and continue to treat the 
detainees who they know will ultimately endure further torture.  
The element of ‘with the purpose’ will most likely relieve most 
medical professionals from liability because they will not likely 
have the “conscious object to engage in [torture] or to cause such a 
                                                     
71  Principles of Medical Ethics, G.A. Res. 37/194, 111th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982). 
72  Id.  
73  MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06, 5.03. 
74  Id. (lacking a requirement for actually committing the alleged crime). 
75  Infra notes 82–84. 
76  MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03. 
77  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06. 
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result.”78  Doctors in extreme examples of purposefully 
participating in torture through providing treatment or 
information to make interrogations more efficient will likely be 
liable under complicity and conspiracy.  This analysis will rely on 
the true intentions of the medical professionals involved and how 
much they intended to aid the offending individuals.  However, it 
is worth noting that, even in these extreme situations where 
doctors actively assisted interrogators in Guantanamo, no cases 
have ever held a doctor complicit to torture or as a co-conspirator 
to torture. 
 
4.2. Distinguishing Between the Gray Areas 
 
Having physicians in the interrogation room and directly 
participating in torture by providing medical information is strictly 
prohibited because the physician carrying out those roles clearly 
violates medical ethics and abuses their role as a medical 
professional.  These black and white scenarios, as discussed above 
and as seen in Libya, also exist when providing care to detainees 
clearly becomes a part of a cycle of torture.  On the other side of the 
spectrum, other circumstances exist where physicians are simply 
treating detainees for general health care concerns, such as for 
diabetic shock, and are clearly justified, and required, to treat these 
patients.  However, with much of the legal framework that exists, 
gray areas occur in the hard cases, but this existence does not 
foreclose on creating policy for clear situations where refusing to 
provide care is clearly ethical and legal.  Physicians would still 
have to treat wounds from interrogations upon the first instance 
when they do not know if the wounds resulted from a cycle of 
repeated improper interrogation or torture.  Upon this first 
instance, physicians would have to give notice and report such 
instances, then, if the medical professionals receive the same or 
similar injuries from the same or different patient, they will have to 
make a medical determination to refuse care. 
 
                                                     
78  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (stating the definition of “act[ing] 
purposely”).  
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5. PROPOSAL FOR POLICY 
 
Laws and policies should protect medical professionals who  
refuse to provide care to detainees when they determine that the 
detainees will only endure further abuse if treated.  Policies 
protecting this decision should also be created to ensure 
safeguards are in place to reduce the risk of abuse.  Comprehensive 
policy should include reporting and notification requirements to 
best protect the patients, doctors, and offending individuals from 
the risks of abandoning care without the chance to first correct the 
abusive behavior.  Again, refusing to provide care to detainees will 
remain an exception to torture policies, not the rule. 
 
5.1. Providing Exceptions Based on Reasonable Medical 
Judgment 
 
The policy proposition is to create an exception to the 
requirement of providing adequate medical care for detainees.  
This exception would allow a physician or medical professional to 
refuse to provide adequate medical care when they know or 
reasonably believes that a detainee or a group of detainees is being 
subjected to repeated abuses in interrogation or torture.  The 
physician or medical professional must reasonably know that 
providing care will lead the detainee to endure continued pain and 
suffering that results from these abuses.  Before the exception can 
be invoked, the physician must first know or believe that abuses in 
interrogation or torture occurred and must provide notice, if 
possible and safe to do so, to the offending individual(s), 
government(s), or organization(s) that if the abusive behavior do 
not cease, the physicians or medical professionals will withdraw 
from providing care.  The medical professional must also report 
the perceived abuse to their medical and military supervisors, if 
possible and if safe to do so.  This report must include important 
and relevant facts about the detainees, injuries, and other 
circumstances so that the supervisors are able to assess and 
provide feedback regarding the refusal of care.  Approval from the 
supervisors is not required. 
The standard of ‘knowledge’ is actual knowledge or reasonably 
should have known given the experience of the physician.  
Ignorance is, thus, not an excuse.  The physicians working in Libya 
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made the determination of torture because the wounds on the 
detainees obviously resulted from beatings and other abuse.79  
Again, this policy aims at holding liable those physicians who fail 
to take the proper action, or refused to act, in circumstances of 
clear torture or abuse.  These policy changes are not meant to 
interfere with the medical autonomy of a physician who must 
decide, based on their reasonable assessment of a certain 
circumstance, whether a detainee is a victim of repeated torture or 
not.  
Currently, New York and Massachusetts have state bills 
pending before their legislatures that address medical 
professionals facing circumstances of abuse in interrogations.80  
Massachusetts House Bill 2017/Senate Bill 101181 in the 188th 
Legislature would establish professional sanctions for medical 
professionals participating in torture and abusive interrogations.  
The bills also include reporting requirements and protections for 
medical professionals that “refuse to participate in prohibited acts 
or who investigate them.”82  The New York bill provides similar 
‘bright line’ provisions to protect health care professionals actively 
refusing to participate in the abuses.83  The proponents of these 
bills find that additional legislation is “vitally important” because 
it provides state professional sanctions on professional behavior 
that “violates professional standards;” improves and protects the 
medical profession’s reputation, domestically and internationally; 
and promotes human rights.84  The Massachusetts bill expressly 
                                                     
79  Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32. 
80  MA and NY Legislation to Sanction Health Professionals Who Torture, 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., available at 
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/issues/torture/us-torture/ma-and-ny-
anti-torture-legislation.html (last visited on Dec. 17, 2013). 
81  S. 1011, 188th Leg. (Mass. 2013), available at 
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/BillHtml/126793?generalCourtId=11.  These 
bills have received support from Physicians for Human Rights, Massachusetts 
Medical Society, and Massachusetts Campaign Against Torture.  The similar bill 
in New York received endorsements from the New York State Nurses 
Association, “15 leaders in the medical and health fields – including two Nobel 
Prize winners, former President George H.W. Bush’s White House physician, and 
New York-based medical school deans and hospital CEOs,” and others.  Press 
Release, Top Medical Professionals Support NYS Anti-Torture Bill, Nation’s First (May 
25, 2010), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Health/20100526/. 
82  MA and NY Legislation to Sanction Health Professionals Who Torture, supra 
note 80.  
83  Id. 
84  Id.  
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prohibits a health care professional from “engag[ing], directly or 
indirectly, in the torture or abusive treatment of a prisoner” and 
includes the explicit prohibition of “examining, evaluating, or 
treating a prisoner to certify whether torture or abusive treatment 
can begin or be resumed.”85  These bills serve as good examples for 
the exceptions that should be made into domestic and international 
policies. 
 
5.2. Reporting and Notification Requirements 
 
When doctors and medical professionals first make the 
determination that they have received a patient that is being 
subjected to abusive interrogations or torture, the doctors should 
continue to treat the detainee.  After this initial determination, the 
doctors and medical professionals must take steps to notify the 
offending individuals of their concerns by stating that the medical 
staff will refuse to provide care if such behavior continues.  This 
notice should only be made when providing notice does not risk 
the safety of the medical professionals. 
Reporting requirements refer to the supervising body of 
medical and/or military professionals to which the doctors and 
medical professionals are assigned.  Physicians and nurses should 
engage these two lines of control when possible.  The supervising 
medical professionals can assist in making a professional 
determination of whether the doctors should withdraw from 
providing care and can serve as a unbiased supporting body that is 
both patient- and doctor- focused, rather than, for example, serving 
as a soldier first.  The medical community, much like the legal 
profession, is a self-regulating profession.86  Thus, providing notice 
to another medical professional will assure extra protection against 
internal discipline and may also provide a ‘safer’ supervising body 
for reporting because it is comprised of peers.  The doctors and 
physicians should also report to military supervisors that may 
have more influence and/or control over the offending body.  This 
reporting also provides protections to the doctors by putting the 
military supervisors on notice of how the medical professionals 
                                                     
85  S. 1011, supra note 81, §§ 1D(b), 1D(b)(iii). 
86  See Our Mission, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-mission.page? (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) 
(detailing guiding principles to improve and monitor the medical profession). 
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will handle this particular situation in case the military needs to 
make strategic decisions based on the refusal of treatment or based 
on the notification that torture is occurring. 
Though reporting requires putting supervisors on notice, 
reporting does not interfere with medical autonomy.  Medical 
professionals can benefit from their supervisors’ input, but are not 
required to follow their proposals if the medics on the ground 
reasonably determine that refusing treatment is the best course of 
action.  Similar to how the Army Field Manual provides 
requirements for reporting to the commander,87 physicians should 
follow similar lines of reporting within the military and with the 
equivalent superior in the medical field.  The EU Guidelines 
Towards Third Countries on Torture also encourages establishing 
“effective domestic procedures for responding to and investigating 
complaints and reports of torture.”88  States should also ensure 
they currently operate functional venues for receiving and 
addressing reports of torture that military and medical 
professionals can access. 
Providing notice is equally important to internal reporting 
because notification could potentially change the offending 
individuals’ or organizations’ behavior without having to 
withdraw care.  The ultimate goal of refusing to treat detainees 
subjected to torture and abuse is to have this behavior to end, so if 
this behavior can change through the ‘threat’ of withdrawing from 
providing care to detainees, without having to do so, that is a 
major success.  In Libya, Doctors Without Borders indeed tried this 
tactic by providing notice to the organizations that tortured the 
detainees, but they continued to receive patients exhibiting the 
same or similar injuries.89  Only after giving this notice did the 
doctors refuse to treat.90  Though the doctors were not successful in 
this example, it is a prime example that notification can and should 
be executed before withdrawing treatment.  Together, notice and 
reporting provide two venues to alternatively stop abusive 
interrogations and torture without refusing to provide care for 
patients that need immediate assistance.   
 
                                                     
87  ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 6, at 5–14. 
88  GUIDELINES TO EU POLICY TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES ON TORTURE, supra 
note 11, at 7. 
89  Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32. 
90  Id. 
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5.3. Counter Arguments and Concerns 
 
Risks to the medical profession, outside of ethics, are also 
present and generally raised in opposition to restricting the 
medical profession in a time of war.  Some argue that the presence 
of medical professionals in interrogations will limit what military 
and other actors do in these interrogations.  However, The 
Constitution Project’s Report on Guantanamo reports that that the 
presence of medical professionals provided an implicit 
authorization to the interrogators behaviors.91  These individuals 
would think, ’If it gets too bad, the doctors will stop it‘ while the 
doctors did not have any authorization and were not empowered 
to make such interventions.92  As former military medic and 
psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Jay Lifton, explained, “[A medical 
professional’s presence] can confer an aura of legitimacy and can 
even create an illusion of therapy and healing” when that 
environment did not exist.93  Thus, this logic not only proved to be 
false, but it actually worked counter to its desired result.  By 
providing policies that give medical professionals the 
authorization to refuse to provide care in certain circumstances, the 
doctors and medical professionals can better protect patients as 
well as provide better support and guidance for the military to 
comply with interrogation procedures. 
Another risk that comes into play with physicians and nurses 
refusing to provide care is the damage to trust of the medical 
profession.  However, this risk to trust must also be understood 
against its alternative action, which is treating patients to make 
them healthy enough to endure repeated aggressive interrogations 
and/or torture.  This risk of perceived compliance to torture also 
comes with risks to the medical community that is addressed 
within the community, including recent conferences.94  This 
                                                     
91  THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 18, at 30–31. 
92  Sharrock, supra note 14 (providing a story from a Guantanamo medic, 
Andrew Duffy, that quoted him as saying, “If a medic was around, there was a 
sense of some control . . . .  The guards probably thought, ‘If I really cross the line, 
this guy would stop me.’”).   
93  Robert J. Lifton, Doctors and Torture, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 415 (2004), 
available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp048065. 
94  See, e.g., The Constitution Project & Global Lawyers and Physicians, Post-
Conference Summary: Medical Care and Medical Ethics at Guantánamo, Washington, 
D.C. (Dec. 2, 2013) (discussing bioethical issues raised in Guantanamo, such as 
“impact of health professionals’ involvement in interrogations on detainees’ trust 
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perceived participation in improper interrogations also places the 
offending country in weak position to regulate the international 
community and other individual countries that also involve the 
medical community in such behavior.95  It “damage[s] the moral 
standing of [these] doctors,” including American doctors.96  Dr. 
Steven Miles states that after the Bush Administration, the United 
States is “now in an extremely poor position to protest abuse in 
other countries.”97  He also warns, “It will silence us as a medical 
community.”98  This distrust and ‘silencing’ is analogous to the 
distrust that the U.S. death penalty created for European doctors.99  
To protect the status of medical professionals that chose to 
participate in the international medical community and the 
public’s trust in its doctors, these provisions that will allow and 
empower doctors to refuse to provide care to detainees should be 
developed. 
Most doctors and medical professionals would not argue that 
refusing to treat detainees subjected to repeat torture is unethical, 
much like most of the medical community do not refute that 
psychiatrists cannot ethically find a patient competent for 
execution.  Dr. Chiara Lepora, M.D, the current program manager 
for Doctors Without Borders, and former Bioethics Fellow at the 
National Institutes for Health (NIH), and Dr. Joseph Millum, Ph.D 
and staff scientist in the Clinical Center Department of Bioethics 
and Fogarty International Center at the NIH, argue that, though 
treating detainees may constitute complicity in torture, this 
                                                     
in military physicians”).  
95  See Sharrock, supra note 14 (reporting bioethicist Dr. Steven Miles’s 
concerns). 
96  Id. (referring to comments made by AMA critics who believe even putting 
new standards in place will not correct the damage that this past behavior has 
caused). 
97  Id.  Though this statement was made before the 2014 Senate report on the 
CIA’s detention and interrogation program, one would assume this sentiment also 
applies to the Obama Administration.  2014 SENATE CIA REPORT, supra note 16.    
98  Id. 
99  See John Gunn et al., Comments to Forum on Psychiatrists and the Death 
Penalty: Some Ethical Dilemmas, 11 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 3 (1998), 
available at 
http://www.wpanet.org/uploads/Publications/WPA_Books/Additional_Public
ations/WPA_Forums_on_Current_Opinion/psychiatrists-death-penalty.pdf (“In 
[light of the U.S. constitution,] it is difficult for European people, who have (with 
the notable exception of some countries of the old USSR) effectively given up the 
death penalty, to understand why a civilised nation indulges in the ritualised 
cold-blooded killing of individuals . . . .”). 
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determination does not constitute an absolute prohibition.100  
Rather, Lepora and Millum state that doctors must consider 
multiple factors before refusing to treat, and can still be justified in 
treating, even when it amounts to complicity to torture (if then 
minimized).101  These factors include: 
 
First, doctors should assess the consequences of the 
different options open to them, including not only 
consequences for themselves and for the patient, but also 
the possible wider social effects, such as encouraging or 
discouraging policies that permit torture.  Second, doctors 
should attempt to discern and follow the requests of the 
patient regarding his or her care.  Finally, doctors should 
weigh the degree to which the act would be complicit in 
torture.102 
 
Though Lepora and Millum raise factors that should be 
included in the physician’s initial determination that she has a 
duty to the detainee not to treat him, Lepora and Millum focus 
largely on consequences of the actions of refusing to treat.  The 
medical professional involved should consider the consequences of 
not treating, but these consequences should remain patient-
focused, as is the doctor’s duty, and only to the extent that the 
consequences trigger the medical professional’s duty to refuse to 
treat.  By focusing on duties, the doctor is more likely to act in 
consideration of their intentions and can focus on the more 
immediate pattern of abuse, rather than hypothesizing about an 
unreliable, ‘ultimate’ consequence for the patient and other social 
considerations.  Lepora and Millum also consider if the offending 
individuals (i.e. the torturers) want that the detainee receives 
treatment.  The offending individuals’ desire to have the detainee 
treated is only relevant when it indicates whether torture will 
occur again.  If a doctor finds that the interrogator’s expression of 
concern regarding treatment is not indicative of whether they will 
torture a detainee, then the doctor should not consider it.  Though 
this argument is overall consequentialist rather than intention and 
                                                     
100  Lepora & Millum, supra note 2, at 38 (“[S]ometimes the right thing for a 
doctor to do, overall, is to be complicit in torture.”). 
101  Id. at 39.  
102  Id. 
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duty focused, this argument includes consideration for patient’s 
wishes and advocates for receiving informed consent.  To the 
extent possible, a patient’s desire to receive treatment, even if they 
may be subjected to further torture, may factor into a medical 
professional’s determination of overall harm suffered by the 
patient.  This consideration of the patient’s wishes in the face of 
repeated torture must reach standards of informed consent to 
receive care, i.e. not from duress and from a full understanding of 
the future pain and suffering, and be a part of a reasonable medical 
decision. 
Another counterargument is that policies permitting the refusal 
of providing treatment are subject to abuse because, though the 
medical profession is self-regulating, the community has not 
disciplined doctors who participate in improper interrogations or 
torture.  One news report stated that “even as the nation debates 
disbarment for the Bush administration lawyers who green-lighted 
torture, the medical profession has dealt reluctantly, if at all, with 
its own involvement.”103  This lack of discipline is especially found 
when government officials or state policy provides for such tactics.  
Retired Army General Dr. Stephen N. Xenakis, M.D., who is 
described as a “rare outspoken critic among military doctors,” 
stated, “’The indifference [of the medical community] is 
shocking.’”104  Most doctors and medical professionals treat based 
on codes and can only reach those who are subject to these codes.  
Providing policies, much like those proposed in New York and 
Massachusetts, that require internal reporting to other medical 
professionals and the use of professional medical judgment can 
empower doctors to use their discretion based on what they 
observe, rather than military protocol.  The internal reporting can 
also strengthen how strictly doctors are held responsible for these 
actions.  Reporting requirements also assist with limiting abuses 
because it involves supervising medical professionals at an earlier 
point in the decision to treat, or not treat, than policy currently 
requires.  Because of this early intervention, reports regarding the 
reasonableness of the reporting physician are taken, which can be 
used for assessing whether discipline is required.  For example, if a 
supervising physician expresses serious concern about the 
reporting physician’s assessment of the situation in the field, then 
                                                     
103  Sharrock, supra note 14.  
104  Id.  
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the disciplinary committee knows that the reporting physician was 
put on notice that her medical judgment was not reasonable, 
supporting disciplinary action.  Again, these situations are for 
those clearly in violation of medical and moral ethics where even a 
physician looking at a cold report could make a decision one way, 
rather than the close cases that depend more on the facts of the 
case.  However, concerns of abuse do not rise out of these ‘gray’ 
cases, but rather out of cases that clearly require the refusal of 
treatment.  In addition, clearer and more pragmatic definitions of 
what is permissible may empower disciplinary board and assist 
courts in taking more action because abuses are more identifiable. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Doctors and medical professionals are legally and ethically 
required to refuse care in certain circumstances when treating 
subjects of interrogations.  At a certain point, doctors and medical 
professionals obey the Hippocratic Oath by refusing to provide 
medical care to those subjected to repeated improper 
interrogations and torture.  These professionals must use their 
reasonable judgment based on their medical training and 
knowledge of the immediate situation to reach a determination 
that providing care will only make the injured individual a victim 
to further, ongoing torture.  Along with this judgment, medical 
professionals must properly report such abuses, and adequately 
notify the offending individuals or organizations that they will 
have to refuse further care if the abusive interrogations do not end. 
The international community and individual States, including 
the United States, must provide adequate policies and practices to 
allow medical professionals to make this judgment.  These policies 
and laws include providing protection from legal and professional 
consequences under torture statutes and other law.  In these 
circumstances, ‘do no harm’ is not requiring ‘do nothing’ but 
rather empowers doctors to refuse to participate in torture and 
work towards its end through putting the international community 
on notice.   
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